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Abstract: In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic
credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the
epistemology of collective testimony. According to the first view, collective testi-
mony inherits its epistemic credentials from the beliefs the testimony expresses—
where this can be seen either as the beliefs of all or some of the group’smembers, or
as the beliefs of group itself. The second view denies any necessary connection to
belief, claiming instead that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony
derive from the reliability or truth-conduciveness of the statement that expresses
the testimony. Finally, the third view claims that the epistemic credentials of
collective testimony derive from the fact that it involves undertaking a collective
commitment to trustworthiness, whichmakes the group susceptible to rebuke and
blame if its testimony is not trustworthy. I argue that this last account holds the
most promise for preserving what is distinctive about testimonial knowledgewhile
still underwriting a robust epistemology of collective testimony.
Keywords: collective testimony, collective belief, collective intentionality, trust,
collective epistemology
1 Introduction
We often learn, that is, we acquire knowledge, from groups. In fact, there are
various kinds of groups whose primary function is to serve as a source of knowl-
edge—think, for example, of the weather bureau, or a commission of inquiry, or a
scientific research team. For groups like these, a central way of discharging their
epistemic role of disseminating knowledge is bymeans of testimony:we learn from
these groups, when we do, by believing them in what they tell us. How they tell us
things may vary, of course: perhaps the weather bureaumaintains a website and a
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Twitter account; the commission of inquiry holds a press conference to announce
its findings; and the scientific research team publishes co-authored papers in
academic journals. I take it that all of this counts as collective testimony, and all of
it might, in principle, be a source of knowledge.
The fact that we acquire knowledge from group testimony raises the question
of what gives group testimony its epistemic credentials. Different philosophers
have given different answers to this question, and my aim in this paper is to
critically examine three leading views on the epistemology of collective testimony.
According to the first view, collective testimony inherits its epistemic credentials
from the beliefs the testimony expresses—where this can be seen either as the
beliefs of all or some of the group’s members, or as the beliefs of group itself. The
second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the
epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the reliability or truth-
conduciveness of the statement that expresses the testimony. Finally, the third
view claims that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the
fact that it involves undertaking a collective commitment to trustworthiness, which
makes the group susceptible to rebuke and blame if its testimony is not trust-
worthy. I shall argue that this last account holds the most promise for preserving
what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge while still underwriting a robust
epistemology of collective testimony.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Testimony and Testimonial Knowledge
Before we examine the three accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony,
it may be worth briefly explaining and illustrating the guiding assumption of this
paper, that we can gain testimonial knowledge from groups. Testimonial knowl-
edge is knowledge acquired, in the right sort ofway, from testimony. But there is no
consensus amongst epistemologists as to what testimony is exactly, nor, for that
matter, what the right way of gaining knowledge from it might be (or even whether
there is a “right way”).1 In this paper, I will adopt the widespread (but still not
1 The lack of agreement is not only substantive but also methodological. Some philosophers (see,
e.g., Graham 2015; Lackey 2006) evidently think that the answer one gives to the question, “what is
testimony?” may depend, in part, on whether one’s interest is epistemological or speech-act
theoretic. In what follows I eschew this way of thinking: I do not think that testimony “as a source
of knowledge”might be something entirely different from testimony “as a speech act”. Instead, I
assume that testimony is a kind of communicative practice, from which people may acquire
knowledge in a distinctive way.
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uncontroversial) view that testimony should be identified with the illocutionary
speech act of “telling”: there is an act of testimony just when a speaker, S, tells an
audience, A, that p.2
The distinctiveness of the speech act of telling can be brought out with
reference to the idea that, in telling someone that p, a speaker aims at “being
believed” (Moran 2005a, p. 26). There are two aspects of this that are especially
worth noting. First, testimony is an inherently relational, and more specifically,
addressive act: a speaker cannot perform the speech act of telling except towards
some audience—whether particular (e.g., a particular person or group) or general
(e.g., “the general public” or “to whom it may it may concern”). We cannot simply
say, for instance, James told that p, and just leave it at that—the description will be
incomplete until we specify to whom James was speaking. This distinguishes
telling from certain other assertoric speech acts such as “asserting”, “stating”,
whichmaybeperformedwithout any audience at all.3 Second, to say that a testifier
aims at being believed is not merely to say that she aims at inducing belief in her
audience, but that she aims at inducing belief in a particular way. Specifically, the
speaker does not offer her word as something for her audience to make up her own
mind about but instead invites her audience to take it from her that p. This dis-
tinguishes telling from, for example, the speech act of “arguing”, which also seeks
to induce belief in the audience but on the grounds of independently cogent
considerations, rather than the speaker’s say-so.4,5
This conception of testimony places certain important restrictions on what
counts as “testimonial knowledge”. First of all, you cannot get testimonial
knowledge from someone’s testimony without being the addressee of that testi-
mony. Imagine that on the bus to work I overhear one person telling another that
Magnus Carlsen successfully defended his world chess title the night before. Since
I recognise the speaker is Norwegian, and I know that Norwegians are renowned
2 Others who take this line include Moran (2005a, 2005b), McMyler (2011), Fricker (2012), Zag-
zebski (2012).
3 I am focussing here on what is distinctive of the speech act of telling, but of course that act also
sharesmanyof the features of the other assertoric acts. Perhapsmost importantly, the act of telling,
like that asserting, stating or declaring, is governed by an epistemicnorm, such as the “truth norm”
or the “knowledge norm”.
4 See Moran (2005a, p.8) and McMyler (2011, pp.54–5).
5 This conception of testimony as telling is broader than, for instance, Coady’s conception, which
confines testimony to those statements that are both uttered by a suitably authoritative or
competent speaker and are relevant to some unresolved question (Coady 1992, p. 42). And it is
narrower than, for instance, Lackey’s conception of testimony, which encompasses all acts of
communication that are either intended to convey, or can be reasonably be taken to convey,
information (Lackey 2006, 2008, Ch. 1). See Wanderer (2013) for an insightful discussion of the
puzzling aspects of learning from testimony, so conceived.
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not only for their unimpeachable sincerity but also their utter reliability with
respect to the accomplishments of Magnus Carlsen, I may thereby come to know
that Carlsen defended his title. But although I attain this knowledge on the basis of
someone’s testimony,my knowledge is not testimonial knowledge. This is because
I was not the addressee of the testimony, and so was in no position to accept the
speaker’s implicit invitation to “take it from me”. Insofar as someone’s word was
offered, it was not offered to me. Nonetheless, the fact of someone’s offering their
word—albeit to someone else—is often itself good reason to believe what they say.
So I am not denying that I can come to know what I overheard, only that my
knowledge is testimonial knowledge.
Note that even when testimony is addressed to you, it is possible to come to
know what you are told on the basis of the testimony without your knowledge
counting as testimonial knowledge. Suppose I know that my enemy wishes to
deceiveme about p, and sowill tell me the opposite of what she really thinks when
I ask herwhether p. But I also know that she is alwayswrong about p, to the point of
being entirely reliable on the matter: she believes not-p when p is the case, and p
when not-p is the case. Hence, when she tells me that p, the fact of her telling me
can function, forme, as a good reason in support of what she says, and so, taking it
in this way, I come to know that p on the basis of her testimony. But this surely does
not count as testimonial knowledge, because I have not accepted her testimony in
the spirit in which it was offered: I certainly did not believe her, or take it from her,
that p.6
Here, then, is how I shall construe testimony and testimonial knowledge in
this paper. An act of testimony is a distinctive sort of speech act, in which one
person tells another that p, therein (implicitly) inviting her audience to take it from
her that p. If the audience does take it from her, then we may say that she (the
audience) believed the speaker, as opposed to simply believing what the speaker
said.7 Testimonial knowledge, then, is knowledge an addressee of testimony gets
by believing the speaker in what she says, by taking it from her that p.
2.2 Group testimony: An Example
As mentioned at the outset, I think it is clear that groups often tell us things and
that we often gain testimonial knowledge from their testimony. Let me illustrate
6 Cf. Anscombe (1979, p.145).
7 This distinction goes back to Anscombe (1979) and has received a lot of attention from pro-
ponents of the “assurance view” of testimony. See, e.g., Moran (2005a), McMyler (2011), Faulkner
(2011), Hinchman (2014).
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this now by giving an example. The example involves what is perhaps the central
mechanism throughwhich groups give testimony, that is, through the deployment
of an authorised spokesperson:
TERROR ALERT: On 24 July 2014, Benedicte Bjørnland, the head of the Norwegian Police
Service, gave the following statement at an emergency press conference: “There is a serious,
credible threat of a terrorist attack on Norway to take place within days.” Bjørnland was
speaking on behalf of the Norwegian Police Service, who had received the threat, and had
judged it to be serious and credible. The purpose of her statement was to inform the Nor-
wegian public of the threat, so that they would exercise extra caution and vigilance.
Itmay seempeculiar, at first blush, to classify spokespersoncases like this as cases of
collective testimony. After all, they tend to involve an individual person uttering
certainwordsonbehalfof theorganisation,soitmayseemmoreapttoconceiveof this
in termsofproxyagency thangroupagency.8But to conclude thatwould, I think,be a
mistake: specifically, it would be to confuse the locution, or utterance, with the
illocutionary speech act of telling. Though it is Bjørnland who comes out with the
string of words, it is the Norwegian Police Service’s mode of organisation—the fact
that the Service has a particular public role, that Bjørnland holds a particular office
within the Service, that shemakes her statement in a particular conventional setting,
and so on—that constitutes her utterance as an instance of the speech act of telling.
Moreover, insofaras therearecertainnormsrelevant to thespeechactof telling—such
as, for instance, the injunction to tell others onlywhat you know—it is clear that these
are not norms towhich the spokespersonherself is beholden.9 Bjørnlandherselfmay
have no view on thematter of which she speaks, ormay evenhold the opposite view,
without this meaning that the norm of testimony has been violated. As far the testi-
mony being offered goes, then, Bjørnland is not the one who offers it: she is but the
“mouthpiece” of the Norwegian Police Service.10
So much for the question of whose speech act is involved in Norway’s Terror
Alert—it is, by hypothesis, the Norwegian Police Service’s speech act and no-one
else’s. But why accept that it is the speech act of telling? It seems to me that the
context makes this clear enough. Specifically, the statement is not made in an effort
to persuade the public or mount an argument to the effect that there is a serious,
credible threat of an imminent attack. Rather, it seems that what the Norwegian
Police Service offers is an implicit invitation for its audience to take it from them that
the terror threat is real. As we have seen, this is the hallmark of testimony.
8 Ludwig (2014) argues for a view along these lines, although he is clear that proxy agency does
require the involvement of the group’s members in authorising a spokesperson as a proxy.
9 Cf. Lackey (2018, pp.37–8): “When spokespersons are speaking on behalf of groups that they
represent, they are not themselves asserting anything at all”.
10 Cf. Tollefsen (2007, p.302).
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Assuming that this is, as it appears to be, a collective speech act of telling, let
us assume further that someone (maybe someone watching the live broadcast of
the press conference) takes up the invitation to believe, and in this way comes to
know of the terror threat. So someone acquires testimonial knowledge from the
testimony of the Norwegian Police Service. The question for epistemological the-
ories of collective testimony, then, is what gives this testimony its epistemic cre-
dentials—what makes it worthy of being believed?.
2.3 Key Desiderata for Epistemological Theories of Collective
Testimony
Inwhat follows, Iwill critically examine threeways of answering this question. The
first focuses on the epistemic credentials of the beliefs expressed by collective
testimony; the second focuses on the reliability of the statement through which
collective testimony is given; and the third focuses on the epistemic significance of
the commitment the group makes in testifying.
In evaluating these different epistemological theories of collective testimony, I
will make use of two key desiderata. The first desideratum is what I will call episte-
mological adequacy, by which I simply mean that the theory should cohere with our
intuitive judgements as to whether or not knowledge is acquired by an audience in
particular cases of collective testimony. The second desideratum is what I will call
testimonial distinctiveness, by which I mean that the theory should reflect—or at least
not undermine—what is distinctive of testimony and testimonial knowledge. More
specifically, an adequate theory of (collective) testimony should not overlook the fact
that testimony is adistinctive speechact, and that testimonial knowledge involves the
audience responding to that speech act in a distinctiveway, by believing the speaker.
3 The Belief View of Collective Testimony
3.1 Summativism
The first approach to collective testimony I will explore is a version of the so-called
“Belief View of Testimony” (BVT).11 According to the BVT, the epistemologically
11 So called by Jennifer Lackey (2008, Ch.2), who is probably the staunchest opponent of this
approach. Note that the BVT is an extremely broad family of (otherwise very different) views of
testimony. It encompasses, for instance, both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of
testimonial warrant.
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salient thing about testimony is that it expresses belief, and hence what gives
credible testimony its epistemic credentials is the epistemic credentials of the
beliefs it expresses. Philosophers who go in for this kind of view tend to see the
epistemological status of a piece of testimony as a product of the speaker’s sincerity
and competence. According to them, we acquire testimonial knowledge by being
faithfully put in touch (this is the sincerity condition) with someone else’s reliably-
held belief (this is the competence condition).
There are two broad ways in which a Belief View of Collective Testimony
(BVCT) can be fleshed out: a “summativist” way and a “non-summativist” way.
Although summativist approach does not have many contemporary defenders, it
can be traced back to a broadly Hobbesian approach to group speech. Hobbes held
that one centralway inwhich groups can speak is by authorising a spokesperson to
express the views held by a majority of the group’s members.12 Put specifically in
terms of the speech act of testimony, a summativist view is one that holds that “a
group’s testimony p expresses the views of all or some of the members of the
group” (Tollefsen 2007, p. 300).13 On this kind of view, then, when we believe a
group in what it says, what we are doing is relying the doxastic competence of (all
or some of) the members of the group.
In the context of individual testimony, the BVT holds that, when all goes well
in testimony, the epistemic credentials of the speaker’s beliefs are somehow car-
ried over, or “transmitted”, from speaker to audience. Summativism about col-
lective testimony introduces a small twist on this formula, exploiting the fact that
whenever a group is on the scene, there are other, smaller agents on the scene too:
the groupmembers. So according to the summativist version of the BVCT, in a case
of collective testimony it is not the speaker’s own beliefs that are expressed, but the
beliefs of those the speaker represents or speaks for—i.e., the group members. But
this need not detract from the credibility of the testimony, since what ultimately
shoulders the epistemological burden is just p’s being competently believed,
regardless of whether the one who so believes is also the speaker. In the case of
TERRORALERT, a viewermight come to know that there is a serious, credible terror
threat because this is something that (all or some of) the individual people in the
Norwegian Police themselves know, this member-level knowledge being what is
expressed by the words of the group’s spokesperson.
There is, however, a fundamental problemwith the summativist version of the
BVCT. The problem is that it seems we can acquire testimonial knowledge that p
12 See Pettit (2008, Ch.5).
13 The summativist approach resembles the so-called summative approach to collective attitudes,
according to which “To ascribemental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing
such predicates to its members” (Quinton 1975, p.17).
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from collective testimony that p without any individual member of the group
believing that p. To see this, let us embellish our earlier examplewith the following
backstory:
DIVISION OF EPISTEMIC LABOUR: Imagine that the Norwegian Police Service has a policy
governing whether to inform the public of national security threats. The policy states that the
public should be informed of the threat if and only if the threat is serious, credible and
imminent. Imagine, further, that the task of deciding each of these issues is assigned to a
different expert within the Norwegian Police Service. So if Expert A judges that the threat is
serious, and Expert B judges that it is credible, and Expert C that it is imminent, then the
collectively endorsed view of the Service is that the threat is serious, credible and imminent. If
so, then, given their policy, they are committed to informing the public of the threat, and this
is something they do by having Benedicte Bjørnland make an announcement at a press
conference. Now imagine that Bjørnland herself has no settled view on any of the issues,
much less their conjunction (she prefers to “leave it to the experts”, and is happy to go along
with their findings).14 Furthermore, the experts themselves have differing views on the
various issues, all the while acknowledging one another’s expertise, and hence authority, to
decide for the group on the issue each has been assigned. What this means is that when the
NorwegianPolice Service announces, throughBjørnland, that there is serious, credible threat
of an imminent terrorist attack, they testify to something which none of the individual
members personally believes.15
The problem for the summativist version of BVCT is that it fails to fulfil the
desideratum of epistemological adequacy. While no member believes what the
group tells the public, the group’s testimony is still, intuitively, worthy of being
believed. The distribution of epistemic labour and deference of non-experts to
experts—i.e., the very organisational structures that produce the lack of belief
amongst the members—seem to be impeccable from an epistemic standpoint. So
the Norwegian Police Service in this case exemplifies a well-designed, epistemi-
cally responsible organisation, functioning exactly as it should, and yet the
summativist is bound to deny that their statement is a potential source of testi-
monial knowledge. For if nomember believes what the group tells the public then,
on the summativist approach, the group’s say-so is left completely without epis-
temological credentials: it no longer expresses anyone’s competently believing
that p.
14 Indeed she might not even be a group member. See Lackey (2014, 2018).
15 In someways this example resembles cases of ‘distributed cognition’ as discussed by Hutchins
(1995) and more recently by Huebner (2014).
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3.2 Non-summativism
This kind of problem for the summativist version of the BVCT is what leads
Deborah Tollefsen (2007, 2009, 2011) to develop a non-summativist approach in its
stead.16 Whereas the summativist version holds that collective testimony ex-
presses the views of group members, Tollefsen’s non-summativist view sees it as
expressing the view of the group itself. Collective testimony can be a source of
testimonial knowledge, then, when it faithfully puts one in touch with a competent
collective belief.
According to Tollefsen, in order for someone to be a source of testimonial
knowledge, they must exhibit doxastic stability: “our practice of relying on the
wordof another presupposes that theother has a steadymind” (Tollefsen 2009,p. 17).
But groups, just like individuals, can satisfy this requirement. That is, they can
undergo a process of “steadying themind”, with a view to speaking theirminds— or,
to put this in terms of belief, they can undergo a process of settling and then
expressing, via testimony, a collective belief. To illustrate this, Tollefsen borrows an
instructive example from John Beatty’s (2006) paper, “Masking disagreement among
experts”. The example involves a report produced in 1956 by a panel of geneticists
appointed by the US National Academies of Science, concerning the genetic risks
associated with exposure to radiation. Although there was substantial disagreement
amongst the members of the panel concerning those risks, the panel recognised
the need “to provide a unified story to the public rather than reveal their dissenting
opinions” (Tollefsen 2011, p. 17). Thus they undertook a lengthy, arduous process
of group deliberation, of discussion, debate, drafting and even voting, in order to
arrive at a report they could all sign off on—a jointly acceptable view, which they
then communicated to the public through the publication of the report in popular
media.
According to Tollefsen, the panel’s report “is a paradigm case of group testi-
mony” (Tollefsen 2011, p. 18) because, through this process of group deliberation,
the panel successfully steadied its mind, reaching “a consensus regarding the
information they wanted to convey to the public” (Tollefsen 2011, p. 18). But it is
important to note that the consensus reached was not a consensus of opinion on
what the report was about, i.e., the genetic risks associated with radiation expo-
sure. Rather, the process of group deliberation was aimed producing consensus
16 Note that having established the inadequacy of the summativist approach, Tollefsen (2007)
proceeds directly to a discussion of reductionism vs non-reductionism about testimonial warrant
(vis-a-vis collective testimony). So although I think my interpretation of her view is correct, it
should be noted that the main claim I ascribe to Tollefsen — the claim that collective testimony
expresses collective belief — is not, for her, a primary point of explicit discussion.
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with respect to which set of claims the panel would let stand, publicly, as their
collective view. So what the “doxastic stability” of the group in this case really
amounts to is their having settled for themselves the question of what their col-
lective view will be, or what view they will represent themselves as having.
One might think that this betrays a degree of insincerity in the panel’s report,
making it strange that Tollefsen should call it a “paradigm case” of collective
testimony. This impression may be encouraged by Beatty’s original article, which
highlights the fact that information about internal disagreements in the panel was
intentionally withheld from the final report (hence the paper’s title, “Masking
disagreement…”). But Tollefsen does not see any of this as undermining the
credibility of the report. This is because she conceives of collective testimony as
expressing a collective belief, rather than the beliefs of themembers, and she holds
that a collective belief is the sort of thing that can indeed be produced via the sort of
essentially negotiative process that Beatty describes. Hence, in settling the ques-
tion of what view they would let stand as their collective view, the panel thus
actually makes up its collective mind.
I think this is where the problem with Tollefsen’s account lies. The problem is
not that groups are generally insincere speakers, nor that they are routinely
incompetent believers. Rather, the problem concerns the epistemic credentials of
competent collective belief, on Tollefsen’s model of it. To see this, note first that in
viewing the panel of geneticists as having formed a genuine collective belief via a
process of negotiation, Tollefsen tacitly adopts what is sometimes called a “joint
acceptance” account of collective belief, according to which collective belief is
producedwhen a set of people openly let someproposition stand as their collective
view. In fact, this is probably the most widely held account in the literature on
collective belief, with versions of it having been defended by Margaret Gilbert,
Raimo Tuomela, Frederick Schmitt, Philip Pettit and Tollefsen herself.17 But,
whatever its independent merits, this view of collective belief cannot help to
vindicate the epistemology of collective testimony, because it allows collective
belief to be properly, competently held for non-epistemic reasons. And this means
that the guiding principle of the BVT, that we are entitled to believe what others
competently believe, does not apply at the collective level.
To see why this is so, consider what the right kind of reasons are, for individual
and collective belief respectively. As far as individual belief goes, it seems clear
that the only reasons which are of the right kind for individually believing that p
are reasons which bear, positively, on the question of p’s truth. This means that a
competent individual believer of p is one who is sufficiently sensitive to
17 See, e.g., Gilbert (1987, 2002), Tuomela (1992), Schmitt (1994), Pettit (2003), Pettit and List
(2011), and Tollefsen (2002, 2004, 2015).
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considerations that bear onp’s truth, and this, in turn, helps to explainwhy the fact
of one person’s competently believing that p can feature as a reason of the right
kind for another person to believe that p.
What, then, of collective belief? Well, when collective belief is understood as
what a group of people openly let stand as their collective view, as the joint
acceptance account has it, then the right kind of reasons for the collective belief
that p will be any reasons that bear positively on the question of whether to let p
stand as the group’s view. This means that amongst the right kinds of reasons for
collectively believing that p are reasons that do not bear on the truth of p—such as
reasons of politeness, of solidarity, of political advantage, of financial gain, etc.
But this poses a serious problem for Tollefsen’s non-summativist account of col-
lective testimony, because if collective belief can be properly, competently held for
non-epistemic reasons, then being put in touch with a competent collective belief
is not a proper epistemic reason to adopt that belief oneself.
We can illustrate this by altering once more the backstory in our case of the
Norwegian Police Service:
MANUFACTURED COLLECTIVE BELIEF: Imagine that the Norwegian Police Service is facing
severe cuts to its public funding, which will result in the withdrawal of key resources, and
many police officers losing their jobs. The leadership of the Police Force recognise, however,
that the plan to reduce public funding would not be implemented if the country is perceived
as subject to any kind of concrete terror threat. So when the latest terror threat is received, the
Police Force comes to an internal “understanding” that the threat is serious, credible and
imminent. In other words, the (relevant, or “operative”) members agree to let the proposition
“There is a serious, credible threat of an imminent terrorist attack on Norway” stand as their
collective view, i.e., the view of the Norwegian Police Service. And, of course, they decide to
express this view publicly, since it is only by publicising the view that they will achieve their
aim of forestalling the funding cuts.
There are at least two quite different ways that this sort of scenariomight be seen to
pose a problem for Tollefsen’s account. One way is to see it as impugning the
account of collective belief that Tollefsen tacitly incorporates—the joint acceptance
account of collective belief. This is how Lackey (2020), who describes a similar
case, sees its significance. According to her, the group in such a scenario is
obviously lying, but a joint acceptance account of collective belief prevents us from
reaching that verdict. That is because, on a joint acceptance of collective belief, the
group in this scenario would actually believe what it asserts, and so would fail to
meet the insincerity condition on lying.
A different approach—the one I take here—is to grant the joint acceptance
account of collective belief and focus instead on the implications this has for the
epistemic credentials of testimony that expresses collective belief. Sowe grant that
the view expressed is indeed the view of the group (a group viewmay be formed by
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agreeing to let some proposition stand as the group’s view), and that view is
supported by the right kind of reasons for collective belief (since the right kind of
reasons for collective belief are any reasons that bear positively on the question of
whether to let some view stand as the group view). This means that the group is
sincere and competent,which should be sufficient, on a belief viewof testimony, to
make its testimony credible. But, of course, the group’s testimony in this case is not
really worthy of being believed, since it is not based on sound epistemic reasons.
Hence, Tollefsen’s non-summativist version of the BVCT does not fare much better
than its summativist counterpart: it too fails to fulfil the desideratum of episte-
mological adequacy.
In short, the problem for Tollefsen is that the epistemic credentials of
competent collective belief, at least on one leading account of collective belief,
may be considerably weaker than those of competent individual belief. And this
means that the fact of p’s being competently collectively believed does not give
someone apprised of that fact any reason to herself believe that p. It doesn’t help to
insist, as Tollefsen (2007, 2009) does, that groups may need to be monitored more
closely than individuals for trustworthiness and credibility; the problem runs
deeper than that. For even when groups are competent in belief and sincere in the
way they relay their beliefs through testimony, their testimonymay still notprovide
an audiencewith a reason to believewhat they say. This is because the fact that p is
competently collectively believed is not, in general, a reason to believe that p.
4 Lackey’s Statement View of Collective
Testimony
It seems, then, that neither version of the BVCT provides a satisfactory account of
the epistemology of collective testimony. The problem with the summativist
version is that it is too restrictive: it forces us to discount some collective testimony
that is intuitively worthy of being believed. By contrast, the problem with the non-
summativist version is that it is too permissive: it provides no resources for dis-
counting collective testimony that is intuitively unworthy of being believed. It is
worth noting that aside from failing to fulfil this epistemological desideratum,
these two views also fail to satisfy the other key desideratum mentioned earlier,
testimonial distinctiveness. On both the summativist and non-summativist ver-
sions of the BVCT, the fact that testimony is a distinctive speech act is relegated to a
somewhat incidental, or at least merely instrumental, role in the epistemological
story. On these accounts, the speaker’s words function only to put us in touch with
competently held belief, this belief being what shoulders the epistemic burden of
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collective testimony. But this, I suggested earlier, threatens to undermine the
distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge.
It is considerations such as these that have led Jennifer Lackey to argue that, in
both individual and collective testimony, it is not the speaker’s beliefs but her
words or statements that give credible testimony its epistemic credentials:
“The process of communicating via testimony does not involve a speaker transmitting her
belief to a hearer, along with the epistemic properties it possesses. Instead, a speaker offers a
statement to a hearer, alongwith the epistemic properties it possesses, and a hearer forms the
corresponding belief on the basis of understanding and accepting the statement in question.
Statements are not, therefore, merely vehicles for expressing beliefs but, rather, they are the
central bearers of epistemic significance themselves.” (2006, p. 93)
In line with this, Lackey (2014) develops a “deflationary account of collective
testimony”—“deflationary” because it accommodates collective testimony within
the Statement View of (individual) Testimony (SVT) that Lackey has given else-
where.18 According to the Statement View, a hearer acquires testimonial knowl-
edge from a speaker’s testimony not by being put in touch with a competently held
belief, but by being presented with a “reliable or otherwise truth-conducive”
statement. Group testimony, then, will be apt to produce knowledge (will be
worthy of belief) just when the statement put forward in the name of the group is
suitably reliable. There is thus no need to ascribe any doxastic attitudes or abilities
to the group itself.
To illustrate her view, Lackey gives the example of Sam,who is a spokesperson
for, but not a member of, the UN Population Commission. Sam’s job is to compile
data submitted by various members of the commission, and thenmake statements
reflecting the data she has compiled. Now of course, because of the division of
epistemic labour within the Commission, it is possible that some of these state-
ments that Sammakeswill not be claims that are believed by any of themembers of
the commission. This is because, in compiling the data, Sam has the discretion to
conjoin hitherto separate pieces of data or make other kinds of straightforward
inferences from the data she receives. In the example, one such statement is
produced when Sam connects the data concerning the historical birth rate of
Latinos in the USwith the latest figures. So she states that “the birth rate of Latinos
in the US is on the rise”, and since this statement is pieced together from two
separate sources, this is something that no member is even aware of, let alone
believes.
The question is, what could give this piece of collective testimony its epistemic
credentials? According to Lackey, there is no need to posit group belief or group
18 Most fully, in Lackey (2008).
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knowledge, as the non-summativist version of the BVCT has it. Instead, we can see
the epistemic credentials of this collective testimony as “determined by the reli-
ability of the proffered statement” (Lackey 2014, p. 79), where this reliability could
be further explicated in variety of different ways. For instance, we could think the
statement is reliable if all the statements that are produced in this way, i.e., by
people who occupy Sam’s role, as spokesperson for this group, tend to be truth-
tracking. Alternatively, we could examine whether Sam herself has a good track
record of coming out with true statements, or perhaps whether she is a virtuous
epistemic agent. Lackey does not commit herself to any of these ways of spelling
out the relevant notion of reliability. Her point is simply that neither Sam’s belief,
nor the beliefs of the group’s members, nor (if there could be such a thing) the
group’s own beliefs, are necessarily relevant to the epistemic credentials of this
collective testimony. All that matters is that the statement itself can be relied upon.
From a purely epistemic standpoint, Lackey’s account surely cannot be faul-
ted. If a speaker’s statements are reliable then of course they should, or at least
may, be believed. So Lackey would have no trouble accounting for the case of
DIVISIONOF EPISTEMIC LABOUR, since in that scenario the organisational design
of the Norwegian Police Service ensures that the group’s statement is indeed
reliable (despite the lack ofmember belief). Moreover, on Lackey’s view statements
that are not reliable should not be believed. So Lackey would have no trouble with
the example of MANUFACTURED COLLECTIVE BELIEF either, since in that sce-
nario the cynical production of a certain convenient collective belief would clearly
undermine the reliability of the statement that expresses that belief. So it seems
that Lackey’s account fulfils the desideratum of epistemological adequacy.
The problem for Lackey’s account, as I see it, lies in its failure to satisfy the
second of the desiderata laid out earlier—testimonial distinctiveness. Lackey’s
account recommends that we believe testimony just when we take the speaker’s
words to be a reliable indication of the truth, and of course treating someone’s
words in this way is indeed a perfectly sound way to attain knowledge. But note
this is the same way we attain knowledge when we believe the readings on our
thermometers and kitchen scales, or when we eavesdrop on the soliloquys of our
mortal enemies, and so we might question whether the knowledge one attains in
this way is what I earlier characterised as “testimonial knowledge”. One person’s
speech can obviously be the occasion and cause of another person’s acquisition of
knowledge, including knowledge of what was said. But not all such knowledge
deserves to be called testimonial knowledge. Testimonial knowledge is the special
sort of knowledge that an addressee of testimony gets by believing the speaker, by
taking it from her that p, and it is possible to treat someone’s speech as reliable—and
hence to believe what they say—without believing the speaker herself. The prob-
lem for Lackey, then, is that her account threatens to undermine the
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distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge, by reducing the epistemic credentials of
testimony to the reliability of the speaker’s statement.
To see this, let us consider yet another version of the case of the Norwegian
Police Service:
LEAKED EMAIL: Imagine once again that a terror threat is received, and is judged by the
Norwegian Police Service to be credible, imminent and serious. However, in this scenario, the
Police Service is required by law to consult with the Prime Minister before any information
about the threat can be made public. So the head of the Police Service sends an email to the
Office of the Prime Minster, stating that there is a credible, serious threat of an imminent
terrorist attack. But before any decision can be made about whether the public should be
informed, this email is leaked to the press, which means that news of the threat gets widely
circulated.
It seems correct to say that both the Prime Minister and the public can acquire
knowledge of the terror threat from the testimony contained in the email from
the head of the Police Service. But intuitively the way they acquire that knowl-
edge, and as a result, the kind of knowledge they each acquire, seems markedly
different. This is because only the Prime Minister was the addressee of the Police
Service’s testimony: only she was being invited to take it from them that there is a
terror threat. The public, by contrast, was decidedly not meant to hear of the
terror threat, and so was not invited to take it from them. So while both the
public and the Prime Minister can clearly acquire knowledge of the threat from
the statement of the Police Service, only the latter acquires testimonial
knowledge.
The problem for Lackey is that no such distinction is available on her State-
ment View of Collective Testimony. Since the reliability of the Police Service’s
statement is unaffected by the fact that it is later leaked, it seems that everyonewho
encounters the statement—both the intended and unintended recipients—can
acquire testimonial knowledge from it, provided itmeets some suitable standard of
reliability. Hence, if we wish to preserve the distinctiveness of testimonial
knowledge, and distinguish it from knowledge that is merely based on someone’s
testimony, then Lackey’s account is also unsatisfactory.
Now, of course, it should be acknowledged that this objection to Lackey’s
account of collective testimony is only as strong as the case that can be made for
the testimonial distinctiveness desideratum—and I have not really attempted (nor
shall I now attempt) to properly justify that desideratum. What this means is that
anyone who rejects the testimonial distinctiveness desideratum, either in general
or only in the case of collective testimony, would be unmoved by the objection.
This would no doubt include Lackey herself, who clearly rejects the notions of
testimony and testimonial knowledge adopted earlier that motivate the
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testimonial distinctiveness desideratum. According to Lackey, testimony is any
statement that either is intended to convey, or can be taken as conveying, infor-
mation, and testimonial knowledge is the knowledge someone can glean from
such a statement. This means that, for Lackey, an eavesdropper or overhearer can
attain testimonial knowledge from a speaker’s testimony just as easily and in
essentially the same way as the addressee—and this suggests she would see
nothing at all untoward about counting the Norwegian public’s knowledge in
LEAKED EMAIL as genuinely testimonial knowledge.
I am happy to accept that this dispute with Lackey boils down to a more
fundamental disagreement over the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge that
cannot be resolved in this paper. A more troubling concern, however, is the
thought that while individual testimony and the testimonial knowledge it pro-
duces may well be distinctive in the manner outlined earlier, collective testimony
and the testimonial knowledge it producesmay not be distinctive in this sameway.
In particular, it might be thought that, in contrast to individual testimony, col-
lective testimony need not involve a speaker making a tacit invitation to “take it
fromme”, and knowledge from collective testimony need not involve an audience
accepting such an invitation.
Something along these lines has recently been argued by Katherine
Hawley (2017). Hawley’s suggestion is that there is no particular reason to
think that collective testimony, like individual testimony, involves a speaker
inviting the audience to “take from me”. Indeed, she suggests that groups may
lack the epistemic and linguistic agency needed to do this. Moreover, in
contrast to the individual case, Hawley claims that there is no real cost—
neither epistemological nor ethical—to viewing group testimony in purely
reliabilist terms:
“We can see groups as producing statements via the functioning of various internal mech-
anisms: wemay then consider whether thosemechanisms lend themselves to the production
of truth or false statements” (Hawley 2017, p.242).
In effect, Hawley is proposing a bifurcated view of the epistemology of testimony—
a view that treats individual testimony as epistemologically distinctive in certain
ways that collective testimony is not. Perhaps that is, ultimately, the right
approach. However, before resigning ourselves to that explanatorily inelegant
conclusion, I think we should first investigate the prospects for an epistemo-
logically robust theory of collective testimony that treats collective testimony as
distinctive in essentially the same way as individual testimony. In the following
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and final section, I tentatively suggest that Miranda Fricker’s “trust-based” view
of collective testimony is a promising candidate for such a theory.
5 Fricker’s Trust View of Collective Testimony
As I see it, Fricker’s account of collective testimony lies somewhere between
Tollefsen’s non-summative version of the BVCT and Lackey’s statement view.
According to Fricker, it is neither the beliefs of the group nor the reliability of the
group’s statement that gives group testimony its epistemic credentials. Instead, it
is something in-between the two, namely the fact that, in testifying, a speaker
makes a certain kind of interpersonal epistemic commitment to her audience. This
is something done in uttering words but it is not equivalent to those words
themselves; and, though it bears important connections to belief (which is an
intrapersonal kind of epistemic commitment) it cannot be identified with belief.
Fricker’s account of the epistemology of collective testimony is rooted in her
“trust based conception of the speech act of testimony” (Fricker 2012, p. 259).
According to her, the act of telling (testifying) is an illocutionary act that essentially
involves the speaker making a commitment of epistemic trustworthiness to her
audience, with the aim of establishing a relation or “deal” of epistemic trust. What
this deal of trust allows is that the audience acquires knowledge by trusting the
speaker for the truth of what she says.
The anatomy of a deal of trust is simple. The speaker first perceives a certain
epistemic need on the part of her interlocutor (which need not be based on an
explicit request for information), and then answers that need by means of testi-
mony. The speaker’s testimony does not simply furnish the audience with the
needed information, but offers that information in a particular spirit: the speaker
implicitly invites the audience to trust her with respect to what she states (“Take it
from me”). In this way, testimony commits the speaker to trustworthiness with
respect to that information, which means that the audience acquires the standing
to blame the speaker or hold her responsible in other ways, should the testimony
turn out to be false.
One ofmainmotivations for a trust-based view of testimony such as Fricker’s is
that it promises to do justice what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge.
Testimonial knowledge is knowledge an audience gets by accepting a speaker’s
invitation to trust her. This is, as Edward Hinchman points out, completely
different from merely treating someone’s words as reliable, since “when you have
evidence of a speaker’s reliability you don’t need to trust her […] You can treat her
as a truth-gauge” (Hinchman 2005, p. 580). The challenge for proponents of this
kind of view, however, is to say how reasons of trust could be good epistemic
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reasons—and hence how testimonial knowledge, understood in these terms, could
ever amount to knowledge at all. Why should someone’s commitment of trust-
worthiness, their invitation to “take it from me”, be a sound epistemic reason to
believe them in what they say?.
One part of the answer to this question is that, inmaking such commitments of
trustworthiness, testifiers make themselves liable to normative sanctions if they
fail to fulfil them—i.e., if they fail to prove trustworthy inwhat they say. So perhaps
it is the threat of being held accountable that gets testifiers, for the most part, to
speak responsibly, telling people only what they themselves know, or have good
grounds for. The problem with this explanation, as it stands, is that it does not
seem sufficient. The mere fact that people are accountable for abiding by certain
norms does not always (or even for the most part) mean that they will abide by
them—especially in contexts where their chances of being found out are low.
Consider, for instance, how drivers routinely break speed limits when they know
their chances of being caught are slim, or how many people illegally download
copyrighted material online, knowing that they are very unlikely to be found out
and prosecuted. In such contexts, people knowingly undertake accountability for
their compliance with norms, but they nonetheless cannot be relied upon to
comply with those norms. Why then should things be different in the case of
testimony? More specifically, if irresponsible testimony is likely to pass unsanc-
tioned, why should the mere fact that testifying involves undertaking re-
sponsibility mean that testimony can, in general, be relied upon?19
It is partly in response to these concerns that Fricker stresses the distinctively
second-personal dimension of the speaker’s commitment. In testifying, the
speaker commits to her audience to proving trustworthy. This means that she
incurs a directed epistemic obligation: she in some sense owes the truth ofwhat she
says to the audience. And, correlatively, the audience acquires a directed epistemic
right: she has the standing to blame the speaker, or epistemically sanction her in
other ways, if the speaker does not live up to her commitment of trustworthiness.
Thismakes the normative situation of testimony quite different from the normative
contexts considered above, in which people (drivers and internet users) are
knowingly accountable in terms of an impersonal and independent normative
standard (speed limits and copyright regulations). The illegal downloader does not
owe it to anyone to respect copyright laws, and the speeding driver does not betray
anyone with her speeding. So while these people are accountable for their actions
in the sense of liable to various kinds of normative sanctions, they are not liable to
19 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the comparison between our trust in
testifiers to tell us the truth with our trust in drivers to obey the speed limit, and for urging me to
address the concern this comparison raises.
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the distinctively second-personal forms of holding responsible that are involved in
testimony.
Fricker’s thought is that it is the threat of these deeply interpersonal reactions
and sanctions that keeps testifiers in line (for themost part), ensuring that speakers
tell others onlywhat they know, or have good grounds for, on pain of being blamed
or shunned.20 This in turn creates a default entitlement for us to believe what
others tell us even when we lack an independent reason to think they are reliable.
As Fricker puts it:
“the testifier’s very commitment to truthfulness is shored up by the implicit threat of a
powerful kind of blame (‘You betrayed me!’). This is one of the many ways that the ad-
dressee’s holding the testifier to the trust invested is intertwined with the relevant epistemic
relations: in holding testifiers to the truthfulness of their word in the manner of second-
personal trust, addressees far and wide massively boost the veritistic energies that drive a
well-functioning testimonial practice” (Fricker 2012, p. 269).
Fricker thinks that groups too can make commitments of second personal
epistemic trustworthiness in their speech, and to support her view she appropri-
ates Margaret Gilbert’s concept of “joint commitment”.21 A joint commitment, as it
is defined by Gilbert, is a commitment of and by several people to doing something
as a single body, where possible substitutions for “doing something” include both
actions, such as walking together, and attitudes, such as believing that p, or
intending to phi.22 So Fricker’s idea is simply that the characteristic object of a
testimonial commitment, namely, proving worthy of an audience’s second personal
epistemic trust is the possible object of a Gilbertian joint commitment. Just as an
20 One may still, of course, question whether undertaking this form of distinctively second-
personal accountability is something that tends to produce compliancewith the relevant norms. In
answering this question, a more instructive comparison (than with speeding or illegal down-
loading) would be with various other kinds of interpersonal commitments, such as promises. Do
those who make such commitments tend to fulfil them? This is an empirical question that ulti-
mately lies beyond the scope of this paper, though it is perhaps worth noting that numerous social
psychological studies have demonstrated that making interpersonal commitments tends to in-
crease the likelihood of the speaker behaving and thinking in line with those commitments. For
example, it has been shown that people are more likely to follow through on medical treatment
when they promise to do so (Kulik and Carlino 1987), that getting people to make pledges fosters
healthier food purchasing (Schwartz et al. 2014), and that making people enter written agreements
is effective in promoting pro-recycling practices and attitudes (Schultz, Oskamp, and Mainieri
1995).
21 See, esp. Gilbert (2006, 2014).
22 See Gilbert (2002, p.41): “Joint commitments are always commitments to ‘act as a body’ in a
specifiedway,where ‘acting’ is taken in a broad sense. Thus peoplemay jointly commit to deciding
as a body, to accepting a certain goal as a body, to intending as a body, to a believing as a body a
certain proposition, and so on.”
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individual testifier makes a personal commitment of epistemic trustworthiness in
her testimony, so too can a collective speaker—a “plural subject”, as Gilbert would
call it—make a joint commitment of epistemic trustworthiness in its speech. And
when such a commitment is met with an investment of epistemic trust on the part
of the group’s audience, there will be a deal of second-personal epistemic trust on
one side of which is a group: there will be a we-thou deal of epistemic trust.
To illustrate her account of collective testimony, Fricker gives the example of a
government-appointed committee that is given the task of producing a report on
the health risks of certain food additives—a report which will then be published so
that the public can learn of the findings. Such a group would have to be consti-
tuted, Fricker thinks, by way of a joint commitment to epistemic trustworthiness
with respect to what they will say about those health risks in their report (such a
commitment “comes with the job”, Fricker (2012, p. 272) claims), and this joint
commitment forms the basis for the invitation to trust that the report communi-
cates to the public. This means that when a member of the public reads and
believes the report, a deal of trust is sealed between the committee and this citizen,
and so, were it to later transpire that certain members of the committee had been
swayed by bribes from certain food companies, this would amount to a “personal
betrayal” of the citizen by the committee. It is the threat of being blamed for such a
betrayal, or being exposed to other epistemic sanctions or penalties, that ensures
that groups such as this one tend to be epistemically responsible in their testi-
monial practice.
I cannot here give a complete defence of Fricker’s account of collective testi-
mony. Instead I will conclude by briefly saying how I think it satisfies the main
desiderata for a theory of collective testimony, and how it avoids the difficulties
faced by the other accounts I have considered. The primary desideratum for an
account of the epistemology of collective testimony is, of course, that it provides a
satisfying answer to the question of what gives credible collective testimony its
epistemic credentials. For Fricker, the answer is not competent belief, as it was
with both the summativist and non-summativist versions of the BVCT, nor is it
reliable words or statements, as it was with Lackey’s statement view. Instead, for
Fricker the answer lies in the way the joint commitment a group speaker makes in
testifying renders the group responsible to its audience, and vulnerable to blame
and charges of betrayal if its testimony turns out to be false. The prospect of being
held to account in these distinctively second-personal ways promotes good
epistemic behaviour, “massively boost[ing] the veritistic energies of a well-
functioning testimonial practice”, and thereby providing a kind of default, albeit
defeasible, entitlement to take speakers, including group speakers, at their word.
The other desideratum for an account of testimony concern the distinctiveness
of testimony as a source of knowledge: an account of testimony should connect the
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epistemological story on offer to the fact that testimony is a speech act, as well as to
the fact that learning from testimony requires the audience to respond to that act in
a certain way, by believing the speaker, rather than simply believing what the
speaker says. Fricker’s account is tailor-made to fulfil this desideratum. According
to her, the forging of a commitment to second personal epistemic trustworthiness
is just what is done in the speech act of telling—in other words, this kind of
commitment is definitive of that illocutionary act. And testimonial knowledge is
acquired, on Fricker’s account, only by an addressee of testimony taking the
speaker’sword on trust, i.e., by being a party to a deal of second personal epistemic
trust. This is her way of fleshing out what is involved in “believing the speaker”
herself, rather than simply believing what the speaker says.
How would Fricker’s account of collective testimony handle the cases that
posed problems for the other views I have discussed? Consider first the case of
DIVISION OF EPISTEMIC LABOUR in which no member of the Norwegian Police
Service believed what they as a group stated, yet their collective testimony still
seemed, intuitively, to be belief-worthy. For Fricker, what matters in this case is
simply that the joint commitment the Norwegian Police Service makes to proving
epistemically trustworthy vis-à-vis the terror threat be a credible commitment, and
it seems that despite the lack of belief among the members, there is no reason to
doubt that it is. Quite the opposite: the fact that the organisation would be roundly
blamed and censured if their testimony turned out to be false, as well as the fact
that the division of epistemic labour within the organisation follows from episte-
mically impeccable principles of institutional design, suggests that the group’s
commitment is indeed credible, and hence that their testimony is belief-worthy.
In the case of MANUFACTURED COLLECTIVE BELIEF a collective belief is
fabricated for non-epistemic reasons and then expressed as group testimony.
Fricker’s account allows us to deny that this amounts to good or credible collective
testimony. This is because the cynical motives involved in the production of col-
lective belief would impugn the credibility of the group’s commitment to proving
epistemically trustworthy, even if they do not impugn the collective belief thus
produced. Should it come to light that the Norwegian Police Service is expressing a
view they arrived at for non-epistemic reasons, the default entitlement to take
speakers at their word would be defeated in this case. There would no longer be
any reason to think their commitment to proving epistemically trustworthy with
respect to the terror threat is credible, and hence this piece of collective testimony
would not be worthy of belief.
In the case of LEAKEDEMAIL, theNorwegian public only comes to know of the
terror threat because of the leak, rather than by being the addressee of the Nor-
wegian Police Service’s testimony. Fricker’s account allows us to admit that this
counts as knowledge, while denying that it is testimonial knowledge. This is
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because the Norwegian Police Service made no commitment of second personal
epistemic trustworthiness to the public, and so the public was not a party to the
kind of “deal of trust” that makes testimonial knowledge possible. If it turns out
that the information in the leaked email is false, the public would not have the
standing to blame or otherwise sanction the Norwegian Police Service; they may
feel disappointed or concerned about the epistemic competence of this institution,
but they would not have been betrayed. So while the public may come to know of
the terror threat by encountering the Norwegian Police Service’s testimony about
the terror threat, the fact that this testimonywas not publicly addressedmeans that
their knowledge is not testimonial knowledge.
Fricker’s account thus not only satisfies the key desiderata for a theory of
collective testimony, it also delivers the intuitively correct verdict on these three
cases that posed problems for the other views considered. Like Lackey’s statement
view, it manages to do this without requiring that the testifying group, or its
members, believe what it tells its audience. But unlike Lackey’s view, it still re-
quires that the testifying group itself be an epistemic agent, capable of making
interpersonal epistemic commitments, and undertaking distinctively epistemic
responsibilities. On this account, then, collective testimony is not a matter of the
groupmaking its internal epistemic commitments public, somuch as amatter of its
making public epistemic commitments—commitments for which the group’s ad-
dressees may hold it responsible.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have critically discussed three views of the epistemology of col-
lective testimony and suggested that the last of these is the most promising. The
Belief View of Collective Testimony holds that the epistemic credentials of col-
lective testimony should be tied to the beliefs that testimony expresses—where
these might be either the beliefs of group members (summativist version) or the
beliefs of the group itself (non-summativist version). I argued that that both ver-
sions of the BVCT fail on grounds of epistemological adequacy. The summativist
version fails because there are cases of credible collective testimony (such as
DIVISION OF EPISTEMIC LABOUR) where no group member believes what the
group testifies, and the non-summativist version fails because there are cases
(such as MANUFACTURED COLLECTIVE BELIEF) in which competent collective
belief is expressed through group testimony but the testimony is not credible. This
suggests that we should look beyond belief—both individual and collective—in
order to understand what is epistemologically salient about collective testimony.
Lackey’s Statement View of Collective Testimony attempts to do exactly this by
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focusing not on beliefs but on statements, and specifically their reliability. But this
view is also inadequate, I argued, because it fails to do justice to the distinctiveness
of testimonial knowledge—the sense in which testimonial knowledge is knowl-
edge acquired by believing the speaker or “taking it from her”.
The final view considered, Fricker’s “trust view”, seems to me the most
promising. It offers a robust epistemology of collective testimony without under-
mining what is distinctive of testimonial knowledge. According to this view, what
is epistemologically salient about collective testimony is not that it expresses
competent belief, nor that it is constituted by reliable words. Rather, it is the fact
that, in testifying, a group commits itself to proving worthy of its audience’s
epistemic trust.
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